

## INTRODUCTION

### I

When the Swedish Riksdag decided in March 1920 that Sweden should join the League of Nations, there were relatively strong differences of opinion. On the one hand, it was maintained that the League, in spite of its inevitable deficiencies, ought to be capable of developing into a stable and effective organization for the maintenance of peace and the application of justice in the relations between States. The resolution of the Riksdag approving Sweden's entry contains the following passage: »Should the new principles of justice expressed in the Articles of the League actually be realized, our country will be obliged in advance to assume obligations which previously would have been assumed only after due consideration of each individual case . . . Sweden who, with her more than a century old tradition of peace, has devoted herself to playing her part in the work for the development of international justice, should now consider it as her historic mission to co-operate in accordance with the needs of our time and to the best of her ability in the building up of the organization for justice which the League of Nations purports to realize.» On the other hand, it was claimed that the League was principally an organ for the victorious Powers in the World War, and that these might well be expected to dominate entirely within the new organization. It was doubted, therefore, whether it would be possible for the League to act in accordance with the principles of justice

proclaimed at its inauguration, and it was feared that Sweden, as a member of the League, would be drawn into conflicts in which she otherwise need not have taken part, and thereby be forced to act contrary to the principles of justice and the beliefs and interests of the nation. Nevertheless, even the minority in the Riksdag expressed its readiness to work for Sweden's entry into a "true" League of Nations, based on justice. "The day when we are given the opportunity of entering into a League of Nations, which seeks—with due consideration to the freedom of nations and the equality, as far as is possible, of civilized peoples—to unite these peoples in a common effort to maintain peace and build up a permanent order of international justice, will find us ready to make, with gratitude and joyful expectation, great sacrifices for such a product of the feelings of solidarity and brotherhood between nations", was the authoritative opinion of that minority.

After Sweden's entry into the League and the latter had started to function, the criticism of principle against joining the League was gradually silenced. It is true that the new organization did not realize all the hopes, often of a utopian nature, which it had aroused, but the fears which many had harboured when the League was founded, of an international dictatorship of the Great Powers were justified even less. All political currents of any importance supported Swedish policy within the framework of the League of Nations and in accordance with the principles laid down in the League Covenant. Sweden belonged without doubt to those States whose contributions to the League were stamped by loyalty and good will. The Swedish representatives, independent of party loyalty and domestic political differences, worked especially for the recogni-

tion and development of the principles of justice. This work was, in the first place, directed towards a strict application of the provisions of the League Covenant and the rules of international law, together with a development of the provisions dealing with judicial procedure in international disputes. But in the word *justice* were also not infrequently included other desiderata and demands: the admission of the defeated Powers into the League on a basis of equality, the realization of national self-determination, and the revision in certain respects of the peace conditions. Like many other States, Sweden sought to counteract the tendency which she felt to exist on the part of the Great Powers to dominate within the League, and upheld for this reason the position of the Assembly as against the Council. Sweden played an active part in the work for international disarmament. On the other hand, in the question of establishing a system of collective security, Sweden belonged to those States whose attitude was characterized by restraint and reserve. In accordance with the views of the Riksdag and the Government, clearly expressed during the debates on Sweden's entry into the League, it was specifically stated at the time of entry that participation in military sanctions was not considered obligatory. Sweden belonged on the whole to the States who systematically opposed the framing of binding and far-reaching provisions as to sanctions. On the only occasion when sanctions were to a certain extent applied—against Italy in 1935—1936—Sweden, however, participated. Within Swedish public opinion strong demands were put forward for an extension of the sanctions, and criticism was directed against the Powers which, for various reasons, did not desire a strict application of the provisions of the League Covenant in this respect.

The negative results of the action against Italy and the subsequent recognition of her conquest considerably lessened in Sweden, as elsewhere, faith in the League. The lack of power of action, evidenced by the League in other questions during the following years, had the same effect. This, together with the fear that, as a result of membership of the League, Sweden would be drawn into a war between groups of Great Powers, caused her to join the group of States which, before the outbreak of the Second World War, declared that the provisions regarding sanctions were no longer in operation and claimed their absolute right to neutrality in a future war. Even if this standpoint was not expressly recognized by the League, it was upheld or recognized in so many quarters, that the provisions regarding sanctions were generally considered as being in reality no longer applicable.

This attitude on the part of Sweden to the League of Nations must be seen in the light of the standpoint and line of action which have for a long time characterized Swedish foreign policy. Sweden has not—with the exception of the dispute on the Åland Islands, 1918—1921, which was a very special case and quickly settled as a result of the League's decision—herself been interested in changing the status quo; she has lacked both the motive and means for an aggressive policy of expansion. The desire to maintain peace has, therefore, completely dominated; no conceivable change has been considered to outweigh the damage and dangers which a war, even if it did not directly concern Sweden, would entail. This desire for peace, which has been based on tangible interests but which has been, in addition, an important ideal anchored in Swedish tradition and ideology, has been combined with the hope that it might

be possible to settle disputes between States in accordance with general principles of justice and by means of a strongly regulated judicial procedure; hopes which were strengthened especially by the certainty, based on experience, of the unlimited applicability of the method to the Scandinavian group of States. This optimistic view alone, which was to some extent based on the tendency to consider one's own position and attitude as a general one, has brought about a tendency to disregard, or at least to pay less attention, to the problems of "security". This tendency has been sharpened by other circumstances. A critical attitude to various points in the Treaties of Peace concluded after the First World War gave rise to doubts about all agreements apparently aimed at unconditional maintenance of the status quo. An opinion, which may or may not be correct, but which is widespread in many small States—and not least in Scandinavia—that the Great Powers to a higher degree than other States carry out selfish policies, has given rise to a fear of engagements and systems, which would necessarily strengthen the influence of these Powers or, at any rate, give it legal support. Even more important has probably been the fact that Sweden's sheltered geographical position has led to a feeling that participation in a given system of collective security would carry with it dangers, which would not be outweighed by advantages for her own security: Sweden would be obliged to help others, in spite of the fact that she herself could hardly be expected to be in need of help. The Swedish Government wrote as follows on the 1st June 1923 in connection with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League in 1922 on the question of security: "A joint guarantee obligation would mean for Sweden, with her comparatively sheltered geographi-

cal position and stabilized relations to foreign States, an increase in the risk of being drawn into war out of all proportion to the increase in risk which would arise for many other States.”

Through the Second World War and the events connected therewith, it would seem that conditions have arisen favouring a modification in certain respects of the attitude indicated above. This is, naturally, not to be interpreted so that the desire to preserve peace and the fear of war are less strongly motivated than previously. On the contrary, the World War may be considered to have actualized and strengthened already existing feelings and opinions in this respect. It has above all, however, become apparent that peace must be organized and that the attempt at this represented by the League of Nations had not been successful. Work for the building up of an international order based on justice is as before essential, but the necessity has become more apparent for the formation of a sound system for the maintenance of peace itself, as an essential condition for any progress in the relations between States. With this the problem of security comes to the fore. The reasons in Sweden and elsewhere for a critical attitude towards the principle of collective security have probably lost, or ought in any case to have lost, considerably in importance and strength. Developments have only too clearly shown that treaties and provisions of law are but a weak protection against aggressiveness and the lust for expansion, if no organized use is made of power by the peace-loving States. Such use of power must in the first place depend on the Great Powers; it is, therefore, essential that distrust of these Powers should not lead the smaller States into an attitude of anxious caution, which may have the most destructive consequences for themselves. In the case of Sweden, par-

ticularly, it should be apparent that the geographical position of the country and the desire of its people for peace do not constitute any guarantee against attack; that Sweden, unlike her Northern neighbours, has succeeded in keeping out of this war, can be said to be due to a series of fortunate circumstances, a special constellation the recurrence of which in a future war cannot be counted on with any degree of certainty. Faced with new plans for an international peace organization, it seems, for these reasons, to be natural to take a standpoint which is at the same time both more resigned and more positive than the traditional one. In order to further the realization of the principal aim—the maintenance of peace—one should be able to make a contribution even if certain hopes and basic demands cannot be realized.

On the whole it should be stressed that the ideal demands on an international organization should not stand in the way of accomplishing what is possible and realizable, as the latter would unquestionably mean an improvement; i. e. that the best should not be the enemy of the good. Only too often has it been assumed in both Swedish and international debates that only a “true” League of Nations, a League which responded to extremely high demands, would be of any value.

The assumption seems to have been that such a League should comprise all States on a basis of equality and imply the sanctifying of an international order, in which injustice and causes of friction would already be of comparatively slight importance. Acceptance of these demands would in any case defer the setting up of an international organization to the distant future. What is more important is that the line of thought indicated above would seem to be based on a lack of understanding of the pur-

pose of an international organization of States. The purpose of such an organization is to maintain peace in spite of existing difficulties and differences—if there were no difficulties and differences, the organization would be strictly speaking superfluous—and at the same time, by a policy of adjustment and reconciliation, gradually to achieve a state of harmony. In so far as it is possible to achieve a state of harmony, it can be attained only by means of an organization furnished with the necessary power unconditionally to maintain peace, and through the good will which can convert the use of power into a means of lasting improvement in the relations between States. The relevant question is whether a certain organization will result in the greatest possible progress in the present situation—not whether it is the best conceivable form for a community of States.

In the debates in Sweden on an international organization the question has sometimes been taken up as to whether such an organization should be judged principally in the light of the universal interests which it is intended to serve, or whether the specifically Swedish interests should be placed in the foreground. The way in which this question is put is naturally obscure. It is difficult to weigh against each other such abstract conceptions, and it is clear, for example, that the universal interest in maintaining peace is also a Swedish interest. On certain points, however, a comparatively clear conflict arises. In the following summary, judgment is based as a rule on what has here been called universal interests, i. e. an attempt has been made to establish how an organization should be constituted in order to achieve the general, expressly stipulated or tacitly understood, purposes thereof. Where a specifically Swedish



interest is found to necessitate a certain standpoint or observation, this has been specially pointed out.

## II

Many carefully worked out proposals for an international organization have been recently put forward by private groups, and some of them will be dealt with in different sections of our report. The report, however, deals first and foremost with the tentative Proposals for the maintenance of peace and security worked out at Dumbarton Oaks at conversations between representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, and which were published on the 9th October 1944. We assume that the main points of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are intended to serve as a basis for the international organization which the United Nations have declared it their intention to set up. But at the same time we assume that in various—even comparatively important—points the Proposals may be subjected to alterations, clarifications and additions; this has on different occasions been stressed by authoritative quarters (cp. Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on the 28th September 1944, the British Foreign Secretary's commentary in November 1944 and the American State Department's comments of the 20th November 1944). Finally, we have assumed that the Proposals, even after they have been adopted, might in the near future be subjected to modifications. In these circumstances it has seemed both natural and appropriate that our contribution should largely take the form of a discussion of the most important points in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

The main points of the Proposals will be comparatively fully reported and analyzed in the separate sections of the following report. The intention here is to characterize their contents more generally and to take a standpoint of principle to them.

In many and important respects the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals closely resemble the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus it is anticipated that the principal organs of the new Organization will be a General Assembly, consisting of representatives of all States; a Security Council, consisting partly of automatic and permanent members, partly of members elected periodically by the Assembly; an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. The fact that the Proposals are greatly influenced by the international organization set up after the First World War may similarly be seen in several details. There are, however, considerable differences, and it is chiefly these which attract attention and require that a standpoint of principle be taken.

In the Preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations it is declared: "The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.”

The corresponding declaration contained in the first Chapter of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals is as follows:

“The purposes of the Organization should be:

1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in the solution of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems; and
4. To afford a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.”

The Covenant of the League thus mentions the maintenance of justice and peace, and time and again it is stressed that the States must build up their community of life on the principles of right and justice. The corresponding declaration of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals does not mention the words “right” and “justice”, and the main object of the proposed Organization is stated to be the maintenance of peace and security. It must not be concluded from this that there is any real difference between the two declarations quoted. It is important to establish that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals must also presumably be based on the assumption that the rules of international law should be applied, and in all probability the assumption also that certain unstated general principles of justice, which

are specifically referred to in the Covenant of the League, should be respected and serve as guidance for the work of the new Organization. But the differences are none the less significant. They show that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals differ from the Covenant in considering the maintenance of peace and security as an aim overshadowing all others, and that other principles, therefore, even if they are recognized, are not stressed in the same way. This line of thought stamps the entire pattern of the new international Organization.

This is apparent also from the declaration regarding the principles of the proposed Organization, which are included in Chapter II of the Proposals. While under the Covenant it is possible in certain cases for so-called just wars to arise, according to Dumbarton Oaks the United Nations are unconditionally bound to settle disputes by peaceful means, and not to use force or threat of force inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization: “(3) All members of the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered. (4) All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.” Equally all-embracing provisions are given in the following paragraphs regarding the obligations of members to support the Organization: paragraph 5 states that the members must “give every assistance to the Organization in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter”, and paragraph 6 that they must “refrain from giving assistance to any State against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the Organization”. The last sentence of Chapter

It anticipates also that States which are not members of the Organization should be persuaded to act in accordance with the principles laid down: "The Organization should ensure that States not members of the Organization act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The Organization is intended to be incomparably firmer in character than the League of Nations. In the first paragraph of the declaration of principles it is stated that: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States." The words "sovereign equality" cannot, however, be considered to establish the freedom of action of States; they only make clear that States are at liberty to assume their obligations under the new Charter, and that the provisions of the Charter apply equally to all members, with no deviation to the advantage or disadvantage of one State or another. One of the basic ideas of the Proposals is in fact that the members would in various cases be obliged to carry out rules and directions in the framing of which they had not taken part. The General Assembly of the Organization shall as a rule make decisions by a simple or two-thirds majority which are binding on all the members of the Organization. The Security Council can on extremely important points make decisions that are binding on all members, e. g. on the introduction of military or other measures against a State. Amendments to the Charter itself can be adopted in spite of opposition from a minority of the members, and the dissenting States are not at liberty to withdraw from the Organization. There is nowhere stated any right whatever to withdraw from the Organization; members may under certain conditions be expelled but under

no circumstances withdraw of their own accord. This is probably the best illustration of the firm character of the new Organization. It may be recalled that in accordance with an opinion, firmly maintained for many years, the Constitution of the United States permitted the separate States to leave the newly formed Union.

The special character of the proposed Organization is most clearly seen, however, in the provisions for the settlement of international disputes, especially disputes for which judicial procedure is considered to be out of the question. The Covenant of the League of Nations contained in this respect comparatively exhaustive rules for different procedures and the measures which could be taken in connection therewith. The competence of the Assembly and of the Council in these cases acted to a great extent concurrently. General rules were laid down as regards those cases where coercive measures (sanctions) should be resorted to, and on the nature of these measures (Article 16); neither was there any absolute obligation for the members to take part in the so-called military sanctions, at any rate not according to the interpretation of the Covenant maintained by Sweden and several other States and which the League did not reject. The Covenant stated when and in what manner coercive measures were to be used, after which it was up to the members to consider and decide whether the conditions for applying sanctions were fulfilled, and to a considerable extent also to determine what measures they should take, should it be their duty to participate in the sanctions. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are on all these points based on entirely different principles. The method for the treatment of disputes is prescribed in less detail. This depends on the central, or rather

dominating rôle which is in this respect given the Security Council. The Council, which shall function continuously, shall seek to settle disputes, and can, in case of threats to the peace or acts of aggression, decide what measures should be taken to maintain peace and security. It can determine that military and other coercive measures should be employed; and the States are obligated to place military resources at the disposal of the Council. Through the provision for a Military Staff Committee, composed of representatives of the permanent members of the Council, these members will hold a unique position of considerable importance. The Assembly of the Organization lacks all competence in these matters; it "should not", it is stated "on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council".

The difference between the League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in this respect can thus be summed up by saying that the former—even if it is not always clear and complete—contained provisions for the settlement of disputes and the measures which should be resorted to in case of threat of war and aggression, while in the latter these provisions are substituted by authority for the Security Council to act in the way it considers most appropriate and thereby make decisions binding on all members. Expressed schematically and somewhat exaggeratedly: according to Dumbarton Oaks, freedom of action by the Council is introduced instead of the League's system of detailed rules.

It cannot be denied that the basic principles of the Proposals are in the main strongly opposed to the points of view which Sweden, like a number of other States, maintained within the

League. Sweden worked for a continual development of the system of rules, i. e. for the extended supremacy of the idea of justice, for increased power for the Assembly as compared with the Council, and against extending the obligation to apply sanctions. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals go in the opposite direction; they place the Security Council's right of independent decision in the centre and give the Council extraordinary power over the members where action against aggression or threats to the peace is concerned. While the keyword of the Swedish standpoint was "justice", the words typical of the purposes of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are "peace" and "security". The Proposals break with the system of the League on the points, where Sweden wished to develop it, and follow the lines in the policy of the League to which Sweden took up a hesitating or repudiating attitude.

This means that the Proposals are based on a more disillusioned outlook than that which formed the background of the Covenant, and not least to Sweden's activity within the League. The most elementary aim of an international organization, the maintenance of peace, has been put completely into the foreground. The Proposals are characterized by the experience gained after the First World War, and chiefly by the disappointments of that period.

An understanding of, and adherence in principle to, this attitude has already been expressed in the first part of this Chapter. The great merit of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals lies, in our opinion, in their realism, in their concentration on the solution of more immediate, primary and undoubtedly central problems. If peace is to be maintained, it is probably inevitable that power within the Organization be concentrated to an essential degree



in an organ which can act quickly, effectively, and relatively independently. Authority and leadership are necessary, and only the States, which in reality are in a dominating position, can on a legal basis maintain authority and exercise leadership. From this fundamental point of view, the Proposals seem to be a step forward. The goal they set forth is just as essential for the small as for the large States, and perhaps even more important for the small States, who run the risk through a war not only of losing part of their power and territory, but of being completely wiped out.

The future of the proposed Organization depends, however, to a very high degree on the actions of the leading Powers. Whatever the decision in many questions which are still pending—particularly that of the voting procedure in the Security Council—it remains true, that the existence or non-existence of the Organization as an instrument for maintaining the peace depends on these Powers. Only as long as they are united, will the Organization be an effective safeguard for the peace. A rupture between them will under all circumstances jeopardize the very existence of the Organization. A greater responsibility than ever before will, therefore, rest on the peoples and leading statesmen of the World Powers. Only if they in their future policy consider the common interests of mankind, can the aims of the Organization be realized, and the smaller States collaborate in the development of the Organization.

In our opinion there are at present grounds for hope in this respect. The continuous co-operation between the States, which the Proposals anticipate, seems to offer possibilities for an active and progressive peace policy; this very co-operation might

psychologically and morally work towards a deeper understanding and greater unity. If the aggressive States, governed by nationalistic ideology and a lust for expansion, which are or have been the leading opponents of the United Nations, had come victorious out of this World War, all hope in this respect would have been in vain.

The positive attitude to the basic ideas of the Proposals under consideration, which thus, in our opinion, is motivated both by practical interest and ideals, does not imply, however, any unqualified adherence. In our opinion, the Proposals suffer from considerable weaknesses and deficiencies. As far as we can see, more precise wording, a more detailed system of rules and in certain instances definite alterations are necessary in a number of special but far from insignificant points; in this respect the reader is referred to the following sections of this report. We wish, however, in this connection to stress above all, that the concentration on the solution of the problem of peace and security has gone too far, even if one accepts the basic principles of the Proposals, as has here been done. That no attempt is made to lay down practical rules of justice is understandable, but it seems worthy of note that no indication is given of the recognition of certain general principles of justice, or of the obligation on the part of the Organization to uphold them. Admittedly it is stated in the first section of Chapter VIII (on international peace and security) that the provisions given there "should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned", and this statement should be considered as applicable to the Chapter as a whole. But not only can this statement be interpreted

in different ways, but it also and principally deals with only one side of the problem, the importance of which we wish to stress here.

What principles of justice—apart from international law and treaty obligations—are referred to here? At the present primitive stage of international relations it is difficult or impossible to define them clearly. No declaration of rights for the peoples corresponding to that for individuals, which has been introduced into various national constitutions, can now be framed. What we have in mind are certain principles which it would be difficult to define clearly, and which do not always give adequate guidance in concrete cases but which, nevertheless, form the more or less clearly conceived foundation for the attitude of all peace-loving peoples to international questions. Peace must not be secured by a settlement between the strong States at the expense of the weak ones; the integrity and independence of the smaller States must be respected as well as those of the leading Powers; a State which is threatened or attacked must not be forced to make concessions to satisfy a more influential aggressor; the relations between nations must be imbued with some of the tolerance, the mutual consideration, and the feeling for the sanctity of obligations undertaken, which have gradually established themselves in the community life of the most highly developed States. It would be desirable that a more definite reference to these principles, which in spite of their vagueness represent the guiding political line for the future, should be given in the charter of a new international organization.

Under all circumstances, the States which join the Organization must be able to count on the basic principles being recognized and applied in practice. On the whole it would

seem to be a condition for the existence of the new Organization—just as important as the conditions already mentioned—that it should develop towards a more detailed system of rules, that it should gradually become an organization for justice as well as for peace. Only if a firm practice, based on generally recognized principles, be applied and this be successively codified in written rules can the Organization gain moral authority, and unite the States with bonds more durable than those of force. It is desirable, especially for the smaller States, to stress this, and make clear from the very beginning that successful activity for the maintenance of peace must be combined with the building up of a true system of international justice.

In a few points of not particularly great importance, we wish in this connection to recommend modifications in the declaration of principles quoted above. Paragraph 4 states that the members of the Organization “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization”. The words “the purposes of the Organization” might possibly lead to misunderstanding. It is obviously not intended that force should be used as soon as it serves the Organization’s purposes, i. e. the maintenance of peace and security; in that case, the authority of the Security Council would be practically unlimited. The intention must be, of course, that force can only be used in accordance with the rules laid down in the Charter of the Organization. This should, therefore, be clearly expressed. But an explicit declaration should also be added here, to the effect that the use of force must be consistent with recognized principles of justice.—In paragraph 5 it is stated,

that members "shall give every assistance to the Organization in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter". It is clear that this duty to give "assistance" should only apply to the extent given in the provisions regarding coercive measures in Chapter VIII, and the reader is therefore referred to this chapter.

It should be stressed once more that the views and recommendations given in the following chapters of our report regarding the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are based on the lines of thought indicated here: their main purpose is to achieve clearer and more complete rules within the framework of the Proposals, that is to extend the scope of the system of detailed rules. It has not seemed to us possible to go more closely into the question of what form the mutual relations between the Northern States will take within the new international Organization. We wish only to stress that the intimate relations between these States, which find expression in far-reaching arbitration treaties and successful co-operation in many different fields, should make it natural that such regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, as are set out in Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, should be made by them. It is not necessary in this connection to deal with the proposals put forward from certain quarters during the last few years for the formation of a Union or Federation of the Northern States.

### III

We have set forth above views on both the principles of the new Organization and on its structure and activity in the near future. The following chapters are also based mainly on a

short view of the question. Nevertheless, we consider it necessary to take up here, however briefly, certain problems of a less immediate nature, to indicate the desiderata and hopes which arise when taking a longer view.

The working hypothesis on which this report is first and foremost based is that the Organization shall be durable and successful, i. e. that it succeeds in its efforts to maintain the peace, and at the same time develops to an ever-increasing degree into a real organization for justice, and that with this follows a general easing of tension and a stabilization of international relations. We also assume that the work of developing the Organization should be pursued with the intention of creating an increasingly strong and intimate union between the peoples of the world. Problems then arise concerning the expansion of the Organization, its intervention in new fields, changes in its constitutional structure and the detailed adjustment of the relations between the Organization, its Member States and the various groups and individuals within these States.

There has been no reason for us to deal with the peace which will follow the present War or to discuss the relations between victors and vanquished. Everyone must agree, however, that the aim of the new Organization should be universality and that it cannot fully serve its purpose unless it includes all States. The world cannot for ever be divided along the lines drawn up by the fronts in this War. To this we wish only to add a reminder that certain of the desiderata indicated below might be realized in connection with the admission of new States into the Organization; terms might then be laid down which might immediately or after a transitional period be applied to the States already members of the Organization.

When the Organization has succeeded in achieving a sufficiently stable order of peace, it must, in our opinion, start dealing energetically with the question of universal disarmament. It is obvious, and confirmed by experience gained from the period between the World Wars, that this question cannot be dealt with successfully in a situation where a number of powerful States have adopted an aggressive policy, and are openly or secretly preparing for aggression. But when the States, who desire peaceful relations, have assumed leadership, and the period of unrest and uncertainty which may be expected to follow immediately after the War has come to an end, an organized and systematic limitation of armaments will be one of the most important tasks of the new Organization. Thereby, the personal and economic burdens, which now weigh heavily on the peoples, would be limited, and the risks of war that might still exist be diminished. The Organization must, naturally, have adequate military forces at its disposal to be able to master any conceivable threat to the peace.

At a more advanced stage the Organization may also strive for a more thorough adjustment of the relations between Organization, States and individuals. Certain dividing-lines between the competence of the States and the Organization must be drawn up in some respects; such rights for the States as are considered inalienable may conceivably be laid down in the Charter of the Organization. On the other hand, the Organization must require guarantees and obligations from the States in fields which to begin with have been considered as part of the exclusive sphere of the States themselves. Thus, it seems reasonable—and highly necessary where co-operation within the Organization and the community life of the peoples

of the world otherwise is concerned—to require that all States should adopt a free and democratic regime; the States who do not fulfil this requirement might be compelled within a certain period of time to reform their constitutions in accordance with the basic principles of democracy. One principle, which it should be possible to establish earlier, is the duty of the States to respect so-called minorities, and the right of the Organization to intervene if this duty should be neglected. Here, we do not have in mind only national minorities, whose position has been dealt with in different connections in the League of Nations, but others also, such as ethnical, religious, and political minorities. As mentioned below in the Chapter on “The Procedure of Conciliation and Mediation”, the minority-problem dealt with by the League of Nations is “only part of a larger problem concerned with the protection of groups and individuals against persecution and physical or mental violence on the part of their own Governments”. A declaration of rights, whereby the international Organization establishes and guarantees certain fundamental humanitarian rights and fundamental rights of citizens against the authorities of their own State, must be set down here as an important aim.

If the Organization is to develop into a real union of the peoples, its Charter must be reformed sooner or later; a world federation must replace a union of States. These changes might be carried out successively, preferably after a plan drawn up in advance. We shall make only a few remarks here concerning the general lines of a future organization. While in the Organization now proposed the States have one vote each in the Assembly, and the actual difference between the various States lies only in the existence of permanent seats in the Se-



curity Council, a more differentiated and democratic representation must be created in a future federation. To achieve this, a representative organ might conceivably be constituted, consisting of two chambers, one representing the States and the other the peoples; possibly—as in the United States and Switzerland—the States should have equal representation in one chamber, while the principle of differentiation would be applied in the other. As a consequence thereof, the permanent seats in the Security Council should be abolished, and the Council as a whole be elected by the representative organ. An extension of the power of the Assembly as compared with that of the Council could thus be brought about in other respects as well.